

NEUTRALITY, PEACE LEGISLATION, AND OUR FOREIGN POLICY

HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

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FIRST SESSION

**THE FOLLOWING BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS ARE
PENDING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
FOR CONSIDERATION**

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NEUTRALITY, PEACE LEGISLATION, AND OUR FOREIGN POLICY

FRIDAY, APRIL 28, 1939

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met pursuant to adjournment at 10:30 o'clock in the caucus room of the Senate Office Building, Senator Key Pittman (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Pittman (chairman), George, Murray, Pepper, Green, Guffey, Gillette, Borah, Johnson of California, La Follette, and Vandenberg.

Also present: Senator Clark of Missouri.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Dr. Tansill, will you give us your full name and your occupation?

Dr. TANSILL. My full name is Charles O. Tansill. I presume my occupation is that of historian. I have been historian for a good many years in different institutions. At present I am professor of American history in Fordham University.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor, we would like you, in your own way, if you desire, to make any statement you wish on the existing situation in regard to neutrality, or to say whatever you desire on the subject.

STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES O. TANSILL, Ph. D., PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN HISTORY AT FORDHAM UNIVERSITY; AUTHOR OF "AMERICA GOES TO WAR"

Dr. TANSILL. When Mr. White very kindly asked me night before last if I would appear before this committee, I said I was very glad to do so but would not have time to prepare a written statement. Therefore, I shall make merely a verbal statement.

I do not pretend to be an expert in the drafting of neutrality legislation, nor am I a prophet who can forecast the future. I am, however, deeply interested in the history of American neutrality, and last year I brought out a book, *America Goes to War*, which I believe is the most comprehensive picture we have of America's attempt to maintain neutrality during the years from 1914 to 1917. I believe the pattern that was fashioned during those years might well have current vogue.

On August 14, 1936, President Roosevelt, at Chautauqua, made a very important statement. It was to the effect that in the maintenance of American neutrality the President and the Secretary of State, through their attitude and actions, play a decisive role. I heartily agree with this statement, and I am certain that this personal

factor is all important in the determination and the enforcement of a policy of neutrality. As one goes back through the history of American foreign policy it is easy to recognize the fact that neutrality has often been a mere matter of Presidential preference. In 1895, after the outbreak of the Cuban insurrection, President Cleveland was subjected to tremendous pressure in favor of intervention. America should lead a crusade against Spanish barbarity in the Caribbean. In Congress this feeling was very strong and it led a group of belligerent Congressmen to pay a visit to Woodley, President Cleveland's summer home, and demand a declaration of war against Spain. Cleveland gave the committee short shrift. He was even prepared to go so far as to veto a congressional declaration of war. Needless to say, as long as President Cleveland was in office we did not have war with Spain, but as soon as President McKinley was inaugurated there was a different story. Mr. Kohlsmat has given us a very interesting picture of a conversation he had with McKinley in the White House with reference to the sentiment in America in favor of war. The President broke down and openly wept at the very thought of approaching war, but he was not strong enough to stem the tides that were pushing him toward a break with Spain, and it was not long before America was engaged in conflict.

In 1914 we have a similar situation. Once more the personal factor comes to the front. There is little doubt that President Wilson was anxious to maintain neutrality, but his chief adviser in foreign affairs was Colonel House who was far more interested in war than in peace. The role played by the belligerent colonel was a significant one. On September 26, 1914, an instruction was sent to the British Foreign Office in which sharp protest was made against certain British infractions of international law. Shortly after this instruction was sent, Colonel House paid a visit to the White House and was shown this instruction. He was shocked to discover that the Department of State had blundered so badly as to think that as far as England was concerned, America had some rights. He at once canceled the instruction to Ambassador Page, and with the ready assistance of Spring Rice, the British Ambassador, he prepared a new instruction in the best manner of the British Foreign Office.

Mr. Lansing never forgot this picture of a British Ambassador drafting American diplomatic notes. It was an impressive lesson. In his interesting memoirs he frankly confesses that he early became convinced that England was fighting a "holy war." Knowing Lansing's love for office and his ardent desire for political advancement, it is a little difficult not to believe that this crusading fervor had its inspiration in the imperious actions of Colonel House. Of one thing we can be certain: Lansing's notes to the British Foreign office were pieces of delicate artistry. He was able to delude the American people into believing that the Department of State was anxious to defend their rights. At the same time he gave the British Government complete assurance that he really cared little about these same rights that were being daily violated. In this way he was able to transfer the art of "camouflage" from the battlefield to the diplomatic pouch, and only a handful of Americans were aware of the betrayal of their Nation.

As everybody knows, the core of the controversy with Germany was with reference to the conduct of submarine warfare. The out-

standing question in this controversy was the status of armed merchant ships. The attitude of the American Government to this question is clearly revealed in the records of the American Neutrality Board. The Board had long been suspicious of the advisability of permitting armed merchant ships of the belligerent powers to enter American ports, and on January 18, 1916, Secretary Lansing issued a circular which set forth the view that the allied merchant ships should remove the armament from their merchant ships if they did not wish these ships to be regarded as ships of war that could be sunk at sight. This viewpoint had long been advocated by Germany, and Mr. Lansing's conversion was hailed with delight by the Central Powers because it seemed that a path to peace with America had finally been found. But they reckoned without the talents of Colonel House, who strongly favored war with Germany. A terse telegram from the Colonel—February 14, 1916—stopped Secretary Lansing in his rapid flight to the German camp and sent him scampering along an opposite road.

In Congress there was a growing feeling that the best way to prevent war with Germany was through the issuance of a warning to American citizens to refrain from traveling on belligerent merchant ships that carried armament, and on February 17, 1916, Representative Jeff McLemore introduced a resolution which made provision for such a warning. This resolution expressed the feelings of millions of Americans, but it evoked sharp opposition from the administration forces which under the inspiration of Colonel House were girding themselves for war. This fact did not escape the watchful eye of William Jennings Bryan, who warned the American people that President Wilson was "joy riding with jingoes."

In order to overcome this rising tide of opposition in Congress, the President called to the White House a small group of congressional leaders who were surprised to learn that the United States could render a "great service to civilization" by entering the World War at once on the side of the Allies.

Senator BORAH: Are you quoting somebody there?

Dr. TANSILL. I am quoting from memory from articles by David Lawrence in the New York Evening Post, February 22 to February 26, 1916. Mr. Lawrence had access to the White House and I think that his statements have to be given special consideration.

When Senator Stone objected to American intervention in the World War on behalf of the Allies, the President turned toward him and used blunt words that according to the press of that day, were "not the sort that fall usually from Presidential lips." But this lecture had little effect upon Senator Stone whose final words were a challenge: "Mr. President, I have followed you in your domestic policies, but, by God, I shall not follow you into war."

The Senator then returned to the Senate Office Building where Senator Gore heard him coming down the corridors preceded by a barrage of highly explosive profanity. In a short while all Congress was aroused at the news of the imminence of war with Germany, and Speaker Clark called the White House by telephone and requested a conference with the President. After waiting some 7 hours, the Speaker finally received word that he could see the President early the following morning. This famous meeting has usually been referred to as the "Sunrise Conference." At this conference the Presi-

dent was again informed that Congress was not prepared to go to war in order to save the world for democracy.

The President was determined, however, to effect the defeat of the Gore-McLemore resolutions which would have insisted that warnings be given to American citizens against traveling on belligerent merchant ships. This procedure would pave the way to peace with Germany and thus spell disaster to the plans of Colonel House to involve the United States in war. In February 22, 1916, the Colonel had signed with Sir Edward Grey the famous House-Grey Agreement. What were its terms? Strangely enough, they have a familiar ring. They deal with a proposed peace conference. President Wilson was to issue a call to the warring nations to come to a conference that would agree upon terms of peace. If the Central Powers refused to heed this conference call, America would forthwith go to war on behalf of the Allies. In the event that the Central Powers agreed to attend such a conference, but finally declined to accept the peace terms offered them, America would then go to war, to compel acceptance of terms that would largely be dictated by the Allies.

With this data before us it is easy now to understand the anxiety of President Wilson to defeat the Gore-McLemore resolutions which would lessen friction between Germany and the United States. In order to defeat these resolutions, Secretary Lansing engaged upon a most sinister campaign of misrepresentation. For the purpose of influencing congressional opinion, Lansing prepared a memorandum on the subject of submarine warfare which was misleading in the extreme. According to such an eminent authority as John Bassett Moore, Lansing sent to Congress a document which presented a "garbled version" of one of John Marshall's decisions—a version "so false as to constitute practically a forgery."

But this was not all. After the administration had secured the defeat of the Gore-McLemore resolutions by chicanery, the President called Senator Stone to the White House and assured him that it was his "supreme wish" to keep America out of the war. On March 8 the Senator gave out these assurances to the American people in the form of a statement to the press. While this press statement was being read throughout America, the President gave the lie to these assurances by secretly authorizing Colonel House to send a telegram to Sir Edward Grey informing him that the American Government merely awaited a summons from the Allies before calling a peace conference.

The only reason why this peace conference was not called and America drawn directly into the maelstrom of war was because at that time (March 1916) the Allies regarded America as of more value as a neutral than as an actual belligerent. In the graphic phraseology of President Seymour of Yale University: "Thus did opportunity knock loudly upon the door of the allied cabinets." In his memoirs, Lloyd George sharply criticizes Sir Edward Grey for his failure to respond to this loud "knock."

The foregoing is, I believe, a clear picture of the influence of the personal factor in the shaping and enforcement of American neutrality. If in any way the members of this committee believe that the pattern of 1914-17 has a present-day application I should be glad to answer their questions.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Doctor, in a most entertaining and most eloquent way you have painted the picture of the great World War. I want you to apply if you can what lesson we learned from that, as to the present.

Dr. TANSILL. I think, Senator, a certain application perhaps can be made, although these applications are always full of danger. I think the present trend toward giving the President a larger discretionary power may have certain dangerous implications. Surely, the Executive in past years, as one goes down through American foreign policy, has had tremendous discretionary power and has been able to use it.

Now the idea of extending that in the face of what this personal factor has meant in American foreign policy, I can hardly see why this tremendous power would have to be extended. It might have of course very dangerous implications.

Senator JOHNSON of California. When you speak of discretionary power, you mean in relation to neutrality generally, and in relation to the picking of an aggressor in any conflict which may arise?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes, Senator; I mean the idea in any legislation to permit the President to pick an aggressor nation and hold that nation to blame, certainly has very serious and dangerous implications, as far as carrying on a neutral policy is concerned. I think it means the end of neutrality.

Senator JOHNSON of California. And means war?

Dr. TANSILL. Senator, there were many causes. Some of them are included in the so-called "new viewpoints" in American history. One of these new viewpoints emphasizes the influence of the West. The West was very anxious to secure Canada and thereby put an end to the menace of British intrigue with the Indians. The chief exponent of this western policy was Henry Clay, the "Cock of Kentucky."

In the South there was another group of men deeply interested in territorial expansion. They had their eyes on east and west Florida, and at the earliest opportunity west Florida was absorbed without America having any just title to it.

In addition to this pressure for territorial expansion which could be realized through war, we had in the United States a fast-growing feeling of hostility toward England because of her maritime practices. The War of 1812 was a fight for a free sea. In this regard we have a parallel between 1812 and 1914. From 1800 to 1812 we find constantly repeated in American diplomatic notes to England the complaint that British men-of-war were always hovering just outside of New York Harbor.

At this point they could stop and search all incoming and outgoing commerce from New York. This practice was sharply resented by President Madison and helped to build up in America a war sentiment.

In 1914 the same situation existed. As one goes through the records of our Neutrality Board we find the same question arising. The British fleet has taken up its old position of 3 miles and 1 inch outside New York Harbor. When the Department of State strongly protested against this old British custom which brought back memories of the War of 1812, the British Government refused to abandon this practice and in case of war today in Europe it would certainly be revived.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vandenberg?

Senator VANDENBERG. I would like to submit this inquiry. You have described what in your judgment were some of the artificial

forces which produced war in 1917, and you have implied that we ought to have learned something as a result; inasmuch as we got nothing else out of the war, we at least ought to get some experience. When the present neutrality code was written it was written in an effort to take advantage of that experience, and I would like to have your opinion as to whether or not the neutrality legislation heretofore enacted and now in force does in any degree capitalize on the experience of 1914-17 and forefend against similar consequences.

Dr. TANSILL. That is a very far-reaching question. I will say here, as one goes through the picture in 1914—and let us come right down to the thing you are driving at, and that is a question of the shipment, of course, of munitions of war—there is no doubt about it that in America in 1914 there was a very strong sentiment against exporting munitions of war. The Literary Digest again and again had polls, and in those polls, you see a cross-section of American public opinion—a very interesting cross-section—and you find, out in the West and in the Middle West and in the small towns, there is a very strong feeling in favor of stopping those exports, but in the manufacturing East there is a very strong feeling in favor of it.

I believe that if in 1914 we had had mandatory legislation with regard to an embargo on war munitions it might very distinctly have led America along a path to peace. It is impossible to say whether it would. I think the majority of people would have been in favor of it, and I think it would have very largely stopped some economic ties that were fast forming.

When one thinks that in 1916 our exports of munitions to the Allies amounted to \$1,290,000,000 worth, it is an economic tie which is very powerful.

Senator VANDENBERG. Well, then, am I to construe your answer as meaning, in your judgment, the neutrality legislation of the last 3 or 4 years has been helpful?

Dr. TANSILL. I think in case of a war in Europe breaking out, it would be distinctly helpful for a while. There is no question about it. Looking at the situation from 1914 to 1917, I think it would be a distinct advantage to the cause of peace.

Senator VANDENBERG. Well, if you were sitting on this committee, with your vast historical information, what would you vote for? You certainly would vote against the Thomas amendment? I gather that.

Dr. TANSILL. I am afraid that is true.

Senator VANDENBERG. Would you vote to continue the present neutrality legislation?

Dr. TANSILL. I would. I think it is extremely important, yes. I do, however, have very definite reservations in regard to the cash-and-carry proposition.

Senator VANDENBERG. What would you do about that?

Dr. TANSILL. I think I would leave it out.

Senator VANDENBERG. Have you any other specific suggestion to make in connection with our neutrality problem?

Dr. TANSILL. No; I think the bill, with that section left out—section 2—is the best bill you could have.

Senator VANDENBERG. You mean the existing law?

Dr. TANSILL. I mean the existing law, with that particular section left out.

Senator JOHNSON of California. There is a determined effort being made by propaganda to teach the people that they cannot keep out of war; that war in Europe is bound to take us in, and so we are being edged in gradually. Is that your opinion?

Dr. TANSILL. I think it is undoubtedly true, Senator. I think there is a tremendous propaganda and I think, as a matter of fact, it is part of the theme song which was started in 1915, "Let us Save the World for Democracy." I think that theme song now has had a renewed popularity.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Yes; but is it a fact that that is so?

Dr. TANSILL. I do not think so at all. I see no reason at all why we cannot stay out of war.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Of course, if we decide—if the will were present with us to keep out of war—we could keep out of war?

Dr. TANSILL. I think that is unquestionably so.

Senator GILLETTE. I was interested in a statement which you made in your answers to Senator Vandenberg. Would the present neutrality legislation, with the elimination of the cash-and-carry provision, in your opinion be the best type of legislation we could have, having in mind that most of the nations which would buy from us are equipped to manufacture munitions? I would like to have your comment on the advisability of opening up the whole field of raw materials to them, which are of much greater importance than munitions, in my opinion.

Dr. TANSILL. Opening up the field of raw materials to whom, Senator—to everybody?

Senator GILLETTE. By eliminating the cash-and-carry provision—eliminating the possibility of imposing that provision when a state of belligerency exists covering certain other materials.

Dr. TANSILL. Of course, on the question of raw materials it is extremely hard now to differentiate between war materials and materials for peaceful purposes, because so many of them fit into the very same category. Take the World War, you could see the lengthening list of the British contraband. At first it was rather small, but in a very short time it took in everything, and the British very frankly recognized the difficulty of differentiation and did not abide by it at all, so I think that is a very serious difficulty to distinguish between which are and which are not warlike materials. I do not know whether you can draw a hard-and-fast line.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor, I am very much interested in your answers to these questions. The definitions of arms, ammunition, and implements of war are now contained in the act by reference to a proclamation that the President made, I think, in the case of the Italian-Ethiopian controversy. It consists almost entirely of manufactured articles; in fact, I think it is entirely of manufactured articles. Would you not consider that oil is just as much an instrument of war as a cannon or a submarine?

Dr. TANSILL. Well, certainly oil is required to run a motor to run an airplane. There is no doubt about that.

The CHAIRMAN. They use it to run war vessels altogether now, do they not?

Dr. TANSILL. There is no question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. And the gasoline runs the airplanes?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And oil goes into the boilers of battleships today without any treatment whatever?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It is just as much an instrument of war as powder is?

Dr. TANSILL. Well, it certainly is a very strong subsidiary, if nothing else.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, if you embargoed the export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, such as I have described in the act, would you not favor the inclusion of oil in that list?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes, I think it would be extremely important, if you want to stop, of course, any other nation from deriving assistance from America. Those certain war materials are very vital to the conduct of war.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in the event of a war such as we had, would it not be just as much to the interest of Germany, in using submarines, to sink a tanker carrying oil to Great Britain as to sink a ship carrying what we now define as arms, ammunition, and implements of war?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So if a vessel were carrying oil, it would not escape the dangers of the controversy?

Dr. TANSILL. I hardly think it would.

The CHAIRMAN. Then do you think it would be much safer to put oil on the list of arms, ammunition, and implements of war or compel our citizens to part with the title before it goes on the high seas?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes, I think that is a very important plan.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is what is done in the cash and carry. It compels citizens to part with the title to property before leaving the United States.

Dr. TANSILL. My only objection to the cash-and-carry plan is that it names aggressors. Now, whether or not we want to come out and favor certain nations is one thing; but I think under that provision we very definitely do. There is no question about it at all.

The CHAIRMAN. In what way?

Dr. TANSILL. I think, of course, England, with its great fleet, would be favored. She controls the seas and, naturally, she would be favored. The so-called Fascist powers would have no chance at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Would there be any difference in the results, whether you conveyed the title out of the citizen or allowed the title to remain in the citizen until the goods reached Great Britain or France?

Dr. TANSILL. No; my only viewpoint is that if you have a trade, whether the title remains here or there, if you have a large and growing volume of trade with certain nations in time of war, you are going to create economic ties of an important character, and you are going to have an increasing interest in the success of those particular nations that are dealing with you.

The CHAIRMAN. How is that affected by the cash and carry? It goes just the same, whether you have it under the cash and carry or whether you do not have it under the cash and carry. There is only one difference—that is, title is divested before it goes. What difference does it make, if it goes?

Dr. TANSILL. My only viewpoint of course was simply, here—and I am interested in your question there about divesting the title—I understood that under any cash-and-carry plan as carried out you would have a growing commerce.

Now suppose you have this embargo—and, to follow your idea, suppose you lift it from the implements of war, and carry it into the field of raw materials; you really do not have any need for a cash-and-carry problem at all, do you?

The CHAIRMAN. Not if you placed it all on the embargo list.

Dr. TANSILL. I was speaking of the fact.

The CHAIRMAN. That is exactly my position. I think there are only two ways to handle it. One is to not let it go at all—which means an embargo—

Dr. TANSILL. That is exactly it.

The CHAIRMAN. Or, if you do let it go, do not let the title remain in the citizen from whom it goes.

Dr. TANSILL. I think that is exactly right. My only viewpoint was not to let it go.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the logical proposition is to put those things that are used directly in war all under the embargo and let none of them go?

Dr. TANSILL. I think that is entirely right. That is exactly the position I hold.

The CHAIRMAN. From a practical standpoint, do you think you could pass any such legislation through Congress? You have been around Congress for a long time, I happen to know.

Dr. TANSILL. I do not know whether you could pass it or not. I know there are certain economic forces that work very strongly. I know that at the time of the World War there was tremendous pressure from the cotton growers in favor of a market abroad. I know the copper men had a high-pressure group, and I know there were other groups of the same type. Whether or not that same high-pressure type of statesmanship exists I do not know. In those days it did, and it would have been very hard to close those markets.

Whether the results of the World War have made such a very deep impression that you could pass it through, is a point I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You know Senator Carter Glass, of course?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He is recognized as a statesman, as a Christian, and as a model man. Senator Carter Glass at the time the Neutrality Act was up opposed the cash-and-carry on the ground that it would interfere with the export business of this country. He said in effect he did not see why we should bankrupt our own country by reason of a foreign war that we did not start and with which we had nothing to do.

As a practical legislator, I think it would be perfectly futile for us to start in, to propose legislation, if we feel that it is impossible of passage.

Dr. TANSILL. I will say here that as I went through the records from 1914-17 I could see how economic considerations very strongly militated against certain principles of international law. I noticed again and again that England stopped our cotton, and we protested very much, but we were well satisfied finally because the British gave

us a nice price for it, and we said, "All right, as long as we have a good market, as long as you pay us a good price and pick it up, we are perfectly willing to go ahead." And our protest did not amount to 10 cents.

The CHAIRMAN. Take for instance the testimony of Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, who was in entire charge of our war industries during our participation in the World War. I think he is recognized as an economist and as a very astute businessman. He gave it as his opinion here that in any consideration of putting an embargo on cotton we should consider the fact that at this time we have a surplus of 13,000,000 bales that we do not know what to do with. I do not think he used the word "bankrupt," but anyway he said it would dislocate the southern situation. He used words almost similar to "bankruptcy in the South," and he stated that would reflect upon the entire prosperity of the United States.

Dr. TANSILL. It certainly did dislocate things from 1914-16, there is no question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. And yet at that time it could move out of the country?

Dr. TANSILL. It moved straight to Great Britain; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But if you were to carry out your theory of neutrality and place it on the embargo list, it could not move to any of the belligerents at all?

Dr. TANSILL. I am not saying, Senator, of course, that one can make an idealistic plan of legislation. I am only saying here that if you allow essential raw materials that can be used in war to go abroad, you do as a matter of fact raise very serious difficulties.

The CHAIRMAN. You understand, do you not, that the word "cash" has no part really in the description, "cash and carry"?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes; I understand that.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no provision for "cash" in it. The general financial provisions of the law apply, which means that you cannot give credit to a belligerent government.

Dr. TANSILL. Of course France and England have here now, so I understand, bank credits. Their nationals own American stocks and bonds worth \$8,000,000,000. The result is, of course, they have ample funds.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you take for instance the cash and carry. It would, by compelling a conveyance of title, remove certain controversies by reason of capture or destruction of goods?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore if we cannot get it all embargoed so as to remove that danger, then would it not be better at least to make citizens convey the title out of the citizen before it goes?

Dr. TANSILL. I think that is true; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Now, that is the alternative which the committee will probably take up at some time.

Dr. TANSILL. Surely.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us take another question, relating to the Sino-Japanese situation. There has been a great deal of discussion as to whether or not the President should have applied the Neutrality Act in that controversy, and that has in turn brought forth the question as to whether Japan would have benefited by it, or whether China would have benefited.

Dr. TANSILL. Yes; surely.

The CHAIRMAN. I think evidence given here discloses clearly that Japan did not desire to buy manufactured articles, that she could get the raw materials much cheaper. As an illustration, of course, take scrap iron, she could have used steel; or pig iron. Therefore, to have placed the embargo on would have prevented the export from the United States of the manufactured arms, ammunition, and implements of war, which alone China could use, but which Japan did not need, and yet Japan could have obtained raw materials which she alone desires. If we had laid that embargo, it would have benefited Japan instead of China, would it not?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes; it would. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, how are you going to get away from that discrimination in every case where there is a war between a country that has factories and ammunition works, and a country of an agricultural type that has not?

Dr. TANSILL. Of course, a good many wars would be between industrial states. You would not have a parallel between China and Japan very many times. Wars in Europe would be between industrial states.

The CHAIRMAN. But you can conceive of a war like that which might happen?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes; that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. We have that now; but if it did happen—if a war between a manufacturing country and a nonmanufacturing country should take place—then to place an embargo solely on manufactured articles and allow the cash and carry under the international law would seem unfair, would it not?

Dr. TANSILL. It certainly would be a great benefit, of course, to one belligerent. There is no question about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, is it not quite difficult to be neutral between countries at war by simply embargoing manufactured articles and allowing all other materials to go in freely to a manufacturing country?

Dr. TANSILL. I think there is no doubt about it.

Senator GREEN. In answer to one of the recent questions you spoke of the inevitability of the so-called Neutrality Act affecting foreign nations at war differently, causing an advantage to one and a disadvantage to another?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

Senator GREEN. So that there is discrimination even in the Neutrality Act?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

Senator GREEN. Why do you think that foreign nations adversely affected by such discrimination will not resent the effect of the act, and overlook the phraseology in which it is clothed?

Dr. TANSILL. Well, of course, they might very well resent it, very sharply resent it; but, as Senator Pittman has pointed out, you can't have an idealistic act. It would be an extremely hard thing to push through an idealistic act, and I think this is the best we can get under the circumstances.

Senator GREEN. Well, if they do resent it, wherein lies the advantage of this act?

Dr. TANSILL. I do not think we have any particular ax to grind in any particular way.

Senator GREEN. I say wherein lies the advantage?

Dr. TANSILL. Well, of course, we can do this: If, in these particular circumstances, it happens to bear upon a certain nation adversely, and she objects to it, why, of course, it may possibly lead to war—but, at the same time, surely when we have done the best we could under the circumstances, we would be ready to await that conclusion.

Senator GREEN. Yes; but if a so-called neutrality act discriminates adversely against one nation more than another, that nation may well resent it, and that would lead us to war just as though we hadn't the act.

Dr. TANSILL. What particular act are you referring to, Senator?

Senator GREEN. Well, just for illustration, suppose, under the present Neutrality Act, Germany claimed that she was discriminated against and we favored England, and England and Germany were at war, would not Germany resent that act as unneutral just as much as though we had any other unneutral act?

Dr. TANSILL. But how could Germany, under the present legislation, if you leave out certain aspects of this bill, how could Germany claim, as a matter of fact, that she was being discriminated against?

Senator GREEN. She would look at the effect of the act.

Dr. TANSILL. Well, take the effect of the act. How is there any sharp discrimination against Germany?

Senator GREEN. She says England has vessels in which she can carry goods, and she has not.

Dr. TANSILL. We are not responsible for the British merchant marine.

Senator GREEN. She looks at the effect and she says, the effect of the legislation is unneutral.

Dr. TANSILL. Of course, it is always rather easy for any particular nation to find flaws in any other nation's legislation.

Senator GREEN. Then what is there to gain? I am asking you your opinion, whether you favor it.

Dr. TANSILL. I think the legislation as a whole is good, and I am going back to a lesson in history. I think that, in 1914, if we had had the same type of legislation we have here, I think it would have been a distinct deterrent to war.

Senator GREEN. Yes; you said that.

Dr. TANSILL. I am only going back to a lesson in history.

Senator GREEN. Let us not go back to the past. Why would they not resent that legislation now just as much then?

Dr. TANSILL. In 1914 there was never any doubt in the minds of any people in any nation that you had a right to restrict shipments of war material. I do not think there would have been any objection on the part of Germany.

Senator GREEN. Well, at that time there was more respect for international law than there is now. Now they would look at the effect rather than the form. At that time they were more inclined to look at the form, due to their respect for international law. Does not that make a distinction?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes. Suppose, Senator, we enlarge that list to include implements of war, as Senator Pittman intimated: Do you think that would meet the situation better?

Senator GREEN. I am not saying it would. I am asking you if you think the Neutrality Act would keep us out of war.

Dr. TANSILL. Well, I think it would be a step in the right direction. I think if the embargo could be extended to these raw materials, it would be still better; but I am afraid in a political state you can't push through idealistic legislation.

Senator GREEN. Exactly, and this is idealistic legislation, is it not?

Dr. TANSILL. Well, it is aimed at that, and I think it is an important thing to aim at.

Senator PEPPER. Professor, do you think that a war in Europe would have an adverse effect upon the United States?

Dr. TANSILL. I think a war in Europe, in practically any place in Europe, would certainly dislocate our present economic system.

Senator PEPPER. So the people of the United States have a very direct interest in the peace of the world and peace in Europe?

Dr. TANSILL. I think there is no doubt about it; yes.

Senator PEPPER. I suppose what everybody is trying to get at is some assurance that there will be peace in Europe and the world, if possible?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. What are you striving particularly for, to deprive the Nation with any contact with Europe or with any nation in time of war, or are you trying to maintain peace in the world? What is your primary objective?

Dr. TANSILL. I am much more interested in peace than I am in anything else.

Senator PEPPER. Do you think we can have complete peace and have nothing to do with other nations?

Dr. TANSILL. I think one of the best ways not to get your fingers burned is not to go near a fire.

Senator PEPPER. Is that the best way to keep a fire from burning?

Dr. TANSILL. I think when a fire has had a tremendous start and has had tinder thrown on for many years, it is extremely hard to play the part of a fireman.

Senator PEPPER. If you have something that is about to produce a conflagration—a fire—there are two things you can do: You can go off and try to keep yourself from within the limits of its heat?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. I suppose the other thing would be to try to distinguish the various factors that might lead to a conflagration. I suppose a good fireman, if he got there in time, might perhaps be able, in some instances, to prevent the fire from actually coming into existence, and might be able to put it out if it got beyond control. Now, those are physical possibilities, are they not?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. I was just wondering therefore whether the proposal that you made constituted any contribution whatever to peace in the world.

Dr. TANSILL. I believe world peace is an extremely hard thing to effect.

Senator PEPPER. No doubt.

Dr. TANSILL. I think you take on a tremendous task when you attempt it, especially with regard to age-old hatreds of many, many types.

Senator PEPPER. Yes.

Dr. TANSILL. Now, for this Nation to take a positive role, to attempt to put out those sparks which are everywhere breaking out in Europe, is a large order. I do not know whether this particular fire engine or this particular fireman is capable of doing that. Perhaps as a matter of fact he has enough tinder in his own country which might take all his efforts, and perhaps if you happen to have a fire engine and you go far afield to put out fires, some may break out in your own place while you are gone.

Senator PEPPER. Let us ask ourselves the question, if we may, whether or not a conflagration abroad is likely to diminish the possibilities of a conflagration at home.

Dr. TANSILL. That is of course a very difficult problem to answer. At the same time, sparks do fly very very rapidly from abroad, and it might happen to be that in order to keep those sparks down in this country it might be advisable to keep your force at home.

Senator PEPPER. Let us take these age-old difficulties to which you referred.

Dr. TANSILL. Surely.

Senator PEPPER. And all of us admit that they exist, of course.

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. Do you assume the possibility that the United States might have any conciliatory effect in world affairs by having an intelligent knowledge of them and a keen and helpful interest in them?

Dr. TANSILL. I think you are entirely right, Senator, and I am deeply interested in what you say. As I go back to the time of Woodrow Wilson, I think he was very deeply anxious for peace, there is no question about it. I think in December 1916 he worked constantly for peace. I think his great peace note was a very strong gesture toward peace. I do not think it had the slightest effect.

In Europe not only do you have certain war hatreds but you have imperialistic ambitions, which are extremely important. The result is that Woodrow Wilson was turned down very largely because the Allies wanted to realize their imperialistic dreams. They did not want peace at all. They had no desire for peace, and they turned him down "flat," because they wanted to go ahead to their own advantage.

Senator PEPPER. Would I throw you off if I should interrupt you there?

Dr. TANSILL. No; I should be glad to have you interrupt me.

Senator PEPPER. Let us take that as a hypothesis.

Dr. TANSILL. Surely.

Senator PEPPER. If that were the situation at that time, if the Government of the United States had had the power to embargo shipments of arms or other materials of war—in other words, if the Government of the United States was functioning as a Government should function in the control of its own affairs—if at that time the Government of the United States had said to these nations, "If you have imperialistic ambitions, I want you to know that at least you need expect no succor from us in their furtherance," do you think it might have retarded them any? That would have had a tendency toward peace and equilibrium?

Dr. TANSILL. That is exactly what I am pointing out. I think if we could have had an embargo in 1914 it might very well have had a distinct influence on peace. That is particularly true because

England was entirely dependent or very largely dependent upon American munitions. The only way she carried on the Somme campaign was through American help. Therefore, if we had had the chance to embargo the shipment of munitions abroad it would have had a tremendous influence upon the whole allied policy.

Senator PEPPER. Now let us take another case. Let us suppose that war had actually been in progress in Europe, and that after awhile we might assume that Germany was the aggressor. Let us assume that Germany might have repented of its hasty action and then the Allies might have said, after Germany had indicated that she was willing to make an honorable and even a tentative peace, "We are going right on to the aspirations that we dreamed of beforehand of adding to our empires." Then suppose the United States Government had said, "If you expect to go on to such an objective as that you cannot expect aid from the people of the United States," it would have had a tendency toward peace and equilibrium, would it not?

Dr. TANSILL. The difficulty is, of course, in that particular case, you are selecting one particular group of powers, and I think if President Wilson had dared to say to England, "Here! Unless you live up to certain things we are not going to ship our goods abroad," I think he would have been sitting on top of a volcano.

Senator PEPPER. Now, why?

Dr. TANSILL. Because I think here there is always a tremendous pressure from certain manufacturing interests and also there are very strong sympathetic factors. It is a very hard thing to brook England or the Allies, whether from the viewpoint of finance or from the viewpoint of strong sentimental bonds and attitudes.

Senator PEPPER. Do you start off with premising that our predilection is so strong for Great Britain that we are going to cast our destinies with them whatever our loss may be, or have a tendency to be? Then any effort is futile in the first instance.

Dr. TANSILL. I think in the first instance it would have carried through. I think later it was impossible. Remember that in 1914-15 we were in a tremendous economic depression—or "recession," it doesn't make much difference—but we had it. You had a million people out of work in 1915. You had more business failures than at any other time in American history. The result is, when you have this "golden stream" coming over here, it is awfully hard, when you are lifting America out of a slough of economic despond, to check that flow and say "Now, here, we can't do that."

It could have been done in August 1914, but later when it is making thousands of people rich and some 22,000 or 23,000 people millionaires, it is very hard to stop. The ball has been given a strong impetus.

Senator PEPPER. Are you not making a very significant statement when you say that? Are you not saying in substance that the intricacy of our relation with world economic affairs is such that we are inevitably caught in the stresses and the strains that go on in the world?

Dr. TANSILL. I think we are.

Senator PEPPER. If we start off with that premise, to which I heartily subscribe, then are you not just making a futile gesture when you think by affecting one segment of the fabric you are able to keep these stresses and strains from being less intense?

Dr. TANSILL. I am not saying that any legislation can possibly in all cases keep us out of war. I think that is a tremendous commitment that nobody would dare to make.

My only viewpoint is this: I do think in 1914 it would have kept this war machine from ever getting a good start; but after it got a tremendous start, nobody could possibly stop it, and we were drawn directly into the situation.

Senator PEPPER. Now, only one or two more questions. Let us assume that President Wilson agreed to sign the Treaty of Versailles in the faith that the provisions of that treaty, permitting its alteration, would actually be carried out by the sensible nations of the world—let us suppose that the years began to pass away, and that from our perspective here we began to observe that the nations of Europe were not carrying out the expectations of President Wilson, they were not disarming, but Germany was disarmed, and they were oppressing Germany economically and politically—

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. And that they actually were using their collective-security organism as a means of expression of their own ambitions and aspirations.

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. Supposing we saw that situation gradually get more and more acute, and we had sense enough to appreciate that inevitably that would lead to conflict if it were not stopped.

Suppose the Government of the United States had said to Great Britain and to France: "Now, if you are dealing upon your own responsibility—if you expect to rely upon your own resources alone, then you can do absolutely as you please; but if you contemplate ever, when a conflict arises out of this situation, if you expect when that conflict comes to get any help from us in the way of supplies, munitions, or money, or even good will, you are not going to get it, unless you relieve the tension by making concessions that you ought to make, and thereby prevent that conflict from ever becoming acute."

Then suppose they gave us no attention, but said, "You are meddling in the affairs of Europe." In a case like that, we might perhaps be justified in saying to them later on—might we not? "Very well, we gave you constant warning."

What I am talking about is this: Is it not a possible theory at least that we are intimately and intricately affected by what goes on in the world, and that the only way we can have any real assurance of internal stability here is by having a balance of power, throwing it at one time one way, and at other times another, pushing a little bit some times and holding back a little on other occasions? Isn't that a possible theory as to the best way we can preserve internal peace and stability?

Dr. TANSILL. I think, Senator, there is no question about it; you made a very clear case.

If we had gone into the League of Nations and had been represented over there, I do think that all these particular problems would have been very intimate problems of ours. We were linked up with the whole European situation in that case, and so of course we would have to be responsible for their solution. But the very fact that we were not members of the League of Nations enables us to make a wise and independent choice.

Now, I also think there is very grave danger in America at the present time underwriting a boundary in Iraq or Rumania. If we had stayed in the League of Nations and had been able to argue these things out and brought about under collective security a better pattern, then perhaps that pattern would have been worth saving; but at the present time it is a very serious thing as to whether or not we want to preserve a pattern that is pretty badly torn.

Senator PEPPER. The traditional practice of England is to reserve the right of action?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

Senator PEPPER. And you do not know of any instance where a government has tied itself down with laws that deprive itself of freedom of action, do you?

Dr. TANSILL. I think she has undoubtedly carried down, certainly to 1914, a policy of isolation. Since that time, of course, no.

Senator VANDENBERG. I would like to ask you just one further question, to be sure I did not misunderstand you. In your historical analysis I think you said that when President Wilson issued his peace appeal, in December 1916, if it had been preceded by neutral attitudes instead of unneutral attitudes, it might have succeeded in saving the situation.

Dr. TANSILL. Yes; I think that is entirely so. As I went through the German correspondence I saw distinctly that during the whole summer of 1916 the German Government was waiting, again and again, for a peace note. I think, as a matter of fact, there was a very good chance for that peace note to have gone over early during 1916, but I think there was a very strong feeling throughout Germany that the President's early unneutral attitude colored this viewpoint. They thought he was not the person to mediate; so when he did bring out his note, the response of the German press was, "How can this man be an impartial mediator? His record is already on the line, so how can he be an impartial mediator?" So they turned it down on that very basis.

Senator VANDENBERG. And thus history repeats itself? Does not that invite the general conclusion that the greater our neutrality the greater our chance to demand peace for ourselves and peace for the world?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes; I think that is true.

Senator BORAH. You spoke about the extent of our exports of munitions and so forth in 1916?

Dr. TANSILL. That is true.

Senator BORAH. You gave that as a billion—

Dr. TANSILL (interposing). \$1,290,000,000 is a figure that is very often quoted.

Senator BORAH. What was the nature of those exports?

Dr. TANSILL. Those munitions of war include, of course, the raw materials also. They include all that would go in, as a matter of fact, to the manufacture of munitions.

Senator BORAH. Now, another point—just a word with regard to it: Something has been said, and something will continue to be said, about the influence of the United States in ameliorating conditions in Europe and bringing about peace before war starts and afterward, and so forth?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

Senator BORAH. I suppose when Woodrow Wilson left the United States to make peace in Europe he possessed a greater power in European affairs than any American for all the years to come can ever hope to have?

Dr. TANSILL. Surely.

Senator BORAH. He was looked upon largely as a Messiah?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

Senator BORAH. And perhaps his influence would have been great enough to have overthrown any government in Europe if they had opposed him?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

Senator BORAH. Yet he could not, with all the influence brought to bear, write even a decent treaty for the maintenance of peace in Europe?

Dr. TANSILL. There were certain imperialistic motives there, and the Allies were busy scheming behind his back.

Senator BORAH. But what they called Wilson's idealism was merely an attempt to adjust conditions, which they did not propose to have?

Dr. TANSILL. I think that is right, and they didn't have it.

Senator BORAH. They established their boundaries and they rewrote conditions throughout the world, and yet there was sitting in that conference a man who had greater influence with the masters of Europe than perhaps any American has ever had?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

Senator BORAH. Now, it was because of the fact that the forces and influences at work in the matter were wholly different from any conception Woodrow Wilson had ever had?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

Senator BORAH. And that is what you have in Europe and what you have found in the last 24 hours?

Dr. TANSILL. I was in Germany a year ago, talking with a large number of people there in regard to the conference at Versailles. I think one of the things which left the most bitter impression was the failure of President Wilson to break the hunger blockade that was imposed upon Germany in November 1918. The result was that from November 1918 to June 1919 starvation stalked through thousands of German towns, and they couldn't get over the fact that the man who was such a great idealist was not able to get food in to starving millions of people in Germany.

Senator BORAH. Well, we constantly speak of Woodrow Wilson as an idealist. It must be understood that when we talk of him as an idealist we are not speaking about him as an impractical man. He was merely striving for conditions under which people could live in peace?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

Senator BORAH. If he had been an idealist and tried to do things in an impractical way, it would have been a different question; but what they call his idealism was nothing but an attempt to adjust conditions according to principles of justice, and with some degree of permanency, with reference to the people living in Europe?

Dr. TANSILL. And you think the same condition exists today, do you not?

Senator BORAH. Well, I had a slight indication of it this morning.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Do you think the same conditions exist today?

Dr. TANSILL. I am certain they exist today. I think, as a result of Versailles, you have built up a very definite pattern. Now, naturally, there are nations who wish to preserve that pattern. Whether the pattern was a false pattern, prepared in a sinister way, is another thing. They want to preserve it and we would go in and assist in preserving that.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Exactly.

Senator BORAH. Is there anything at the bottom of the European situation except force?

Dr. TANSILL. There has not been.

Senator BORAH. Well, is there now?

Dr. TANSILL. No. The only reason Great Britain holds India is through force.

Senator BORAH. If President Roosevelt, in sending his letter to Hitler, had inaugurated in that letter a statement to the effect that Great Britain would surrender the territory which she took at Versailles, what effect do you think it would have had?

Senator JOHNSON of California. There would not have been the cheers for him?

Dr. TANSILL. I do not think the letter would ever have been written, Senator.

Senator PEPPER. By that you do not mean to take the position that President Roosevelt is not interested in international justice or even European justice, do you?

Senator BORAH. Certainly not. I did not make any such intimation.

Senator PEPPER. I did not mean the Senator.

Dr. TANSILL. No; my only viewpoint of it is, I do not think that any particular President has so much to do with it. I think we are following a pattern which goes back, as a matter of fact, to 1897, a pattern of parallel action with Great Britain. That is exactly what I think.

Since 1897 we have had a very close entente with Great Britain. Take the Boer War of 1899. John Hay openly said, "As a matter of fact, Great Britain is not interested in theory. She wants to win the war. We are not going to stop her in any way." And we did not. So that pattern, so very firmly laid by John Hay, has come right on down through the years to the present time. Parallel action is an old thing.

Senator PEPPER. Dr. Tansill, the President in his suggestion for a peace conference among the nations of Europe did not make any exceptions, or did not deal with anything as to the subjects of it, did he?

Dr. TANSILL. Not at all; no.

Senator PEPPER. I mean the President merely requested or suggested that there be a peace conference in which their aspirations and their claims might be presented, and the Germans, if they wanted to talk about Great Britain's colonies or about India, had a perfect opportunity to do it, did they not?

Dr. TANSILL. But the same thing came up in the House-Grey agreement. The President then sought a peace conference, a regular peace conference. There is no question about that. But as Colonel House had already indicated, the terms of that peace conference

would have been such that Germany could not have accepted them. We would have been in war. A peace conference is one thing, the terms you create in private are another.

Senator PEPPER, I thought one of the greatest assets of the President's message was that he tried to bring out into the open a consideration of their points of view by the several nations involved, and I have always had a feeling, when once you get a fellow to state his case, then you have made some progress toward a solution.

Dr. TANSILL. Here is the difficulty: As you look through Colonel House's papers, in 1916, that was the whole idea. Colonel House went to Germany, France, and Great Britain. He signed a House-Grey agreement for a peace conference, but at the same time had already agreed—and so had the administration by sending him across there—had already agreed to terms which favored allied success.

Senator PEPPER. Let us take the peace conference. We hear a great deal of disparagement these days of everything that was done in those days.

Dr. TANSILL. Surely.

Senator PEPPER. Do you think, after the peace conference, the European situation was worse off, that there was less justice prevailing in Europe than before the peace conference?

Dr. TANSILL. I think in many cases there was created a pattern that had to be broken. I do not think there is any question about that at all. With the peace conference having broken up the Central Powers, and particularly having imposed very sharp terms upon Germany, I think those terms were bound to lead to trouble. I think they were most unfortunate terms.

Senator PEPPER. Was the situation which resulted after the peace conference more filled with the probability of conflagration and conflict than the situation as it existed before the peace conference?

Dr. TANSILL. I think so; absolutely, yes.

Senator PEPPER. You do not think any progress was made then toward the principle of self-determination, in a salutary way?

Dr. TANSILL. I think there was some progress made along the lines of self-determination, but at the same time that progress was bound to lead to future conflict. Take the Polish Corridor. Now, of course, you make a Poland, and you give Poland an outlet, but you were bound therefore to leave a future difficulty between Germany and Poland. Surely, if you have gone through the Polish Corridor and have seen the situation with your own eyes you would know there was trouble ahead.

Senator PEPPER. Have you any assurance there would not have been any conflict if the situation had been then known?

Dr. TANSILL. I do not see why it was necessary to give Poland such a tremendous outlet through German territory. That is bound to lead to trouble, especially with a powerful nation like Germany.

Senator PEPPER. You did not regard the Balkan situation as exactly a place where supreme peace reigned even before the Versailles Treaty, did you? There had been conflagrations going on in the Balkans before the Versailles Treaty.

Dr. TANSILL. That is perfectly true.

Senator PEPPER. So I do not suppose anyone intends to imply that either of these two things is necessarily true—either that you can make the world over in a day or in a year and a half; or, in the second place,

that perhaps there would have been complete peace which might have reigned over Europe and the world if there had not been any Versailles Conference?

Dr. TANSILL. No; my only viewpoint is that the Versailles Conference, in exacting very sharp terms from Germany, laid the basis for the present rise of dictatorship, and, of course, is responsible for the present situation. You cannot possibly keep a proud nation down in a position of thralldom.

Senator PEPPER. Did it ever occur to you to speculate as to what would have been the condition of the world if Germany had won that war? How much peace and equilibrium and justice do you think would have prevailed if they had won the war?

Dr. TANSILL. I do not doubt the terms would have been very hard, either way. Nobody doubts that.

Senator PEPPER. They indicated in 1870 about the kind of terms they would impose upon a losing nation, did they not?

Dr. TANSILL. But, of course, they did not take any of the French colonies, which they could easily have done, and which Great Britain so nicely did in the Great War; so Bismarck did not make such a harsh treaty at all. He might have made a much tougher one. He was much sharper on that point.

I think, therefore, the Versailles Treaty distinctly sowed the seeds of war, and we are reaping the harvest right now. I think it was most unfortunate. Remember, it was not only the European powers, but we had Woodrow Wilson offering to help and soften these terms.

Senator PEPPER. You said the Versailles Treaty was so exacting. It took away the German colonies, and it imposed certain reparation obligations upon Germany?

Dr. TANSILL. That is true.

Senator PEPPER. And it took away the German Navy and its armament. Now, that is what you are referring to when you say the Versailles Treaty was exacting in its terms?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes. It took away colonies. Not only that, but it took away from her Alsace-Lorraine. Maybe she would have lost those provinces. But the whole German Empire was built by iron and coal. Those were taken away from her through the cession of Alsace-Lorraine and other exactions.

Senator PEPPER. How did she get those?

Senator JOHNSON of California. Let him answer.

Dr. TANSILL. That is perfectly true. From there, you move on. You take Upper Silesia. If you go through Upper Silesia today, you will see they simply gave Poland the most important industrial part of that region. They gave her the coal and iron up there. So as Germany looked around she was bereft of her most important raw materials. That was done very carefully. The Saar, of course, was taken away from her, as you remember very well, subject to a plebiscite, so her coal was gone for a short period. Eupen and Malmédy were given to Belgium. Hultschin was given to Czechoslovakia, and of course Memel-land was taken away from her and given to Lithuania. The Polish Corridor and parts of Upper Silesia were given to Poland, and she lost her colonies to England and France.

Surely she could not regard that as a very friendly settlement.

Senator PEPPER. Did you regard the German action during the war as "a very friendly action"? What did they do to Europe and to the world?

Dr. TANSILL. There is no question about the effect of German arms. Senator PEPPER. How would you feel if somebody had provoked the kind of conflagration that Germany provoked in 1914? Do you think the Kaiser should have been given a badge of honor? Do you think the world should have said to Germany, "Go, and sin no more"?

Dr. TANSILL. No; I do not believe that, Senator, for one moment. I do not believe in the European formulas for war. I think that European decisions will always be harsh. My only viewpoint regarding Versailles is that we had the United States in as mediator, we had President Wilson in there in order to get a peace that would bring an end to all war.

My only regret is that with American assistance they made just as poor a job of it as the European nations have made down through the centuries. That is my only point.

Senator PEPPER. Will you admit that in the last few years beginning with the Wilsonian era there has been made the greatest progress the world has ever seen toward international peace and international law and order?

Dr. TANSILL. I would think the present situation surely in recent years is anything but a situation of "peace and order." I think as a matter of fact we have the most unpeaceful period almost in history, when every nation is on the verge of war.

Senator PEPPER. All right. Let us analyze that, to see whether that is such a ridiculous statement or not. For a while there was machinery set up that had the form of an international tribunal?

Dr. TANSILL. Surely.

Senator PEPPER. That was a place where aspirations might be heard and where judgments might be rendered on international questions, was it not?

Dr. TANSILL. That is true, Senator, but with this difference: The international groups there were controlled largely by England and France.

Senator PEPPER. Well?

Dr. TANSILL. The result is that the League of Nations was a very nice organization to keep the "haves" in possession of property which they had received.

Senator PEPPER. That may be true, and it may not necessarily be true. At least you had a place that was agreed upon as the meeting place for the great majority of nations of the world?

Dr. TANSILL. Surely.

Senator PEPPER. And where they actually did sit around and discuss world problems and world difficulties. Did you not?

Dr. TANSILL. That is true.

Senator PEPPER. You had never had the counterpart of that in all the world's history, had you?

Dr. TANSILL. No; you had not.

Senator PEPPER. And you had emanating from that tribunal a number of incidental evidences of international collaboration—for example, there is now at Geneva an international labor organization participated in regularly by the majority of the nations of the world, including the United States, is there not?

Dr. TANSILL. Surely. That is true.

Senator PEPPER. And that very agency is improving world labor conditions, is it not?

Dr. TANSILL. That is true.

Senator PEPPER. And it was the League of Nations that was the germ of that organization in its beginning, was it not?

Dr. TANSILL. Certainly.

Senator PEPPER. Then in addition to that you have a collateral organization that has made possible concerted international efforts toward better health conditions?

Dr. TANSILL. Surely.

Senator PEPPER. Toward better living conditions over the world?

Dr. TANSILL. That is true.

Senator PEPPER. The germ of that came from the League of Nations?

Dr. TANSILL. Surely.

Senator BORAH. Also, Ethiopia?

Senator VANDENBERG. And then you have international intellectual cooperation that emanated from the League of Nations?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

Senator VANDENBERG. Now, because the League of Nations has not, overnight, solved all the problems of the world, does that mean that never again, in the history of the world, should we ever try to get international machinery to secure international peace and for international judgment upon the justice of national problems?

Dr. TANSILL. No, indeed, Senator. I have made a very careful study of peace plans from the year 1000 down—God knows there are a lot of them—but the League of Nations seemed to realize the dreams of many people for many years. The unfortunate part of it was that the background of it, or the basis of it, was very weak. The pattern along which it was going to work was a very poor pattern and, therefore, it defeated the liberal hopes of the whole world.

Senator CLARK. Do you not think the action of the Council of the League of Nations in rejecting the reciprocal trade agreement which was negotiated between Germany and Austria had a very material effect in throwing Germany into the arms of Italy?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes; I think it was a great mistake, and I think it helped accelerate the fall of Austria.

Senator BORAH. You also call to mind the fact that they called on the World Court to consummate the customs treaty?

Dr. TANSILL. That is true.

Senator BORAH. That was one of the first, and most important, acts of the World Court?

Dr. TANSILL. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. Any other questions? Professor, we thank you for your contribution.

(Whereupon, at 12:07 p. m., the committee adjourned until next Monday, May 1, 1939, at 10:30 a. m.)